讲座时间：4月7日14:30-15:30
讲座地点：九里校区零号楼0411室
讲座题目：Supplier Encroachment, Information Sharing, and Channel Structure in Online Retail Platforms
摘要：We develop a game-theoretic model to study the encroachment and information sharing decisions in a supply chain with a manufacturer selling through an online retail platform. In the base model, the manufacturer decides whether to encroach or not by selling through an agency channel, in addition to an existing reselling channel, at the same platform, who decides whether or not to share information with the manufacturer. We fully characterize the equilibrium decisions and show how they depend on the commission rate of the agency channel, channel substitutability and information accuracy. Our analysis unfolds a novel wholesale price effect that extends related results in the literature. We also show that encroachment and information sharing are complementary, and therefore managers should not ignore the impact of one decision on the other decision even when the latter is not a primary motivation of the former. We study several model extensions to obtain additional insights and show that the major findings of the base model are robust and remain mostly valid when some modeling assumptions are changed.
主讲人简介：罗华江，博士，必发7790电子集团助理教授。其主要从事供应链管理、运营管理相关的研究，其文章发表在Production and Operations Management, Transportation Research Part E等国际期刊上。
主办：必发7790电子集团
承办：运营管理创新团队
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