时 间：2019年12月19日周四下午14:00-15:30
地 点：九里校区零号楼0411室
研讨主题一：Macroeconomic Cycle and the Adjustment of Cost Structure：Evidence from China
主讲人：诸波
Abstract :Using a large sample of Chinese manufacturing listed firms over the period of 1998-2016, this paper investigates the effect of macroeconomic cycle on firms’ cost structure. We find that firms will choose a more flexible cost structure with higher variable and lower fixed costs in a recession than in a boom. In addition, the counter-cyclical effect of macroeconomic cycle on cost flexibility is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) in regions with well-developed factor markets. However, that situation does not exist for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in regions with under-developed factor markets. These findings enrich the understanding of firms’ cost structure over the business cycle and also contribute to the study on the determinants of cost behaviour.
研讨主题二：Are executive equity incentive plans golden handcuffs or departure accelerators?
主讲人：刘宝华
Abstract ：This study examines the impact of executive equity incentive plans (EEIPs) on target (those subject to EEIPs) and non-target (those not subject to EEIPs) executive retention using a sample of Chinese firms. In general, we find that EEIPs help retain executives if we do not distinguish target and non-target executives. Using a difference-in-difference research design, we document that, on average, target (non-target) executives in EEIP firms have an approximately 59% (121%) chance of leaving their current jobs as compared to executives in a non-EEIP firm. The results are statistically and economically significant. Hence, EEIPs have the golden handcuff effect on target executives to keep them from leaving their current jobs, but they also accelerate the departure of non-target executives from their current jobs. Additional analysis suggests that the golden handcuff effect on target executives primarily occurs in the first two years of the EEIPs while the departure accelerator effect on non-target executives lasts four years. The golden handcuff effect on target executives is magnified when they are inadequately compensated. Corporate policy implications are also discussed.
欢迎我院师生参与交流学习！
